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BASIC PROTECTION-RELIEF FOR THE ILLS
OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CASES*
Jeffrey O'Connell**
For a long time automobile accident cases have been clogging
our courts, delaying and therefore often denying justice to all
litigants. According to a recent study, the flood of automobile
accident trials (typically two-thirds of the court's civil jury
docket) has produced an average of over 31 months delay for
trials in large metropolitan communities. The longest average
delay, 69.5 months, was in the Circuit Court of Cook County
which serves Chicago. The next longest outside of Chicago, 51.5
months, was in the Supreme Court of Westchester County in
New York. This was followed by the Court of Common Pleas
in Philadelphia with 50.8 months, the Supreme Court in Kings
County, New York, 50.5 months, and the Supreme Court in Suf-
folk County, New York, 48.2 months.'
In discussing court congestion, it is important to note that
all this automobile litigation is only the top of an iceberg. As
the visible top is chipped away, more of the invisible mass below
the surface rises. Cases filed represent only a small fraction of
the total number of claims, and in turn, cases tried represent only
a small fraction of cases filed. As an example, a recent survey
in New York City showed that of the 193,000 annual claims of
victims seeking to recover damages caused by someone else's
fault, only 7,000 reach trial, and of these only 2,500 reach verdict.
Claimants simply cannot fight through the thicket to a court
verdict.2 If the backlog were not so great, more patient clai-
mants would pursue their claims into and through the courts.
This means that proposed solutions, such as the abolition of jury
trial for automobile cases and the appointment of more judges,
* These remarks were prepared for but not delivered to the Section on Judicial
Administration, American Trial Lawyers Association's Annual mid-winter meeting
in New Orleans, Louisiana, February 10, 1967.
Portions of the manuscript are adapted from a book written by the author
and Professor Robert E. Keeton of the Harvard Law School, KEETON & O'CoN-
NELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM-A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (196) [hereinafter cited as BASIC PROTECTION].
** Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
1. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STATE TRIAL COURTS OF GENERAL
JURISDICTION-PERSONAL INJURY JURY CASES V (Calendar Status Study, 1966).
2. Franklin, Chanin & Mark, ACCIDENTS, MONEY AND THE LAW: A STUDY OF
THE ECONOMICS OF PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 10
(1961).
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are likely to be frustrated by the backlogs they are designed to
alleviate. If only partial improvements in the whole system are
achieved, the more the backlog of traffic cases is reduced, the
more additional cases will be entered for trial, thus wiping out
any saving achieved !3
The problem, then, goes deeper than procedural questions
such as whether cases are to be heard by judge or jury. The
problem, in essence, is what is being heard, not who is hearing
it. And the problem is not only the cost and delay in compensa-
tion but the unfair way in which compensation is paid or not
paid, quite apart from high cost and delay.
The solution, in turn, lies not so much in procedural devices,
like switching from juries to judges or appointing more judges,
but in attacking the automobile cases more directly-,in making
fundamental changes in the criterion for paying claims of traf-
fic victims. Under present automobile insurance, you can be
paid after a traffic accident only by making a claim against the
other driver's insurance company on the basis that such other
driver was at fault in causing the accident and that you were
blameless. The result is that all traffic claims today are domi-
nated by attitudes of distrust and even outright hostility ac-
companying any negligence lawsuit. Professor Robert E. Keeton
and I propose a plan which we call the "Basic Protection Plan,"
under which the bulk of automobile insurance claims would be
paid as fire insurance claims are paid-by one's own insurance
company and without regard to anyone's fault. Just as your
fire insurance company pays for the loss you suffer when your
house burns, regardless of whether you were careless with a
lighted cigarette, so, under the Basic Protection Plan, your au-
tomobile insurance company would pay you for your out-of-
pocket loss, regardless of negligence. (But just as fire insurance
does not cover intentionally burning your house, so one who in-
tentionally injures himself in a traffic accident would not be
paid by Basic Protection insurance.) 4
Basic Protection insurance is in essence an expanded version
3. CONARD, MORGAN, PRATT, VOLTZ & BOmBAUGir, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT
COSTS AND PAYMENTS-SIUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION 4
(1964) [hereinafter cited as CONARD et al].
4. The details of the Basic Protection Plan, including a draft statute, together
with documentation of the pressing need for its adoption, are presented in Basic
Protection. See also KEETON & O'CONNELL, AFTER CARS CRASH--THE NEED
FOR LEGAL AND INSURANCE REFORMS (1967), a version written for the general
or non-technical reader.
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of supplementary coverage most people already carry in their
automobile policies-the so-called medical pay coverage, under
which your own insurance company reimburses your actual
medical expenses up to a stated limit (say, $500 or perhaps even
$2,600), regardless of who was at fault in the accident. Basic
Protection would do the same for all kinds of out-of-pocket losses
(wage losses, for example, in addition to medical expenses) up
to a limit of $10,000 per person and would do so at a lower cost.
Amidst the din of outraged cries at ever-increasing automobile
insurance premiums under the present system, a respected in-
dependent actuary has calculated that the premiums for this
Basic Protection Plan, if it were put into effect in New York
State, would be substantially lower than rates for the present
system. 5
But before turning to an examination of the new system that
would right the wrongs of the present one, perhaps these wrongs
should be more explicitly identified. In the first place, the dif-
ficulties caused by the role of "fault" under the present system
are greatly exacerbated by the difficulty of applying the concept
of fault to traffic accidents. Who knows what really happened-
or who was at fault-in the typical traffic accident? As a high-
ranking GM official has stated, the nub of the highway safety
problem stems from the fact that "both the masses and speed of
cars exceed those of any of the other machines with which we
work."6 (The only remotely comparable instrument is the power
mower, which is proving a hazardous instrument itself, though
not on a scale to be seriously compared with the automobile.)
Perhaps the constant exposure to the danger of an auto crash
dulls the sense of peril and the significance of the details of the
cause of the crash. In any event, no other common occurrence
in our daily lives hinges upon details that no one involved can
clearly recall, as is the case with an auto accident. A former
law professor who is now an active trial lawyer-an expert in
both the practice and theory of negligence cases-has com-
mented that after a traffic accident in which he was involved he
was astounded to discover how little of the accident he could
intelligently recall. Right after the accident, he says:
"I ... tried to think of the things I should observe and remem-
5. Keeton & O'Connell, Basic Protection and the Cost of Traffic -Accidents,
38 N.Y.S.B.J. 255 (1966).
6. Stonex, Roadside Design for Safety, in -IADDON, SUCHMAN & KLEIN, Ac-
CIDENT RESEARCH: METHODS AND APPROACHES 707, 708 (1964).
1967]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ber to include in my accident report to my insurance com-
pany. It was easy to see just where the two cars came to
rest [or] ... at least, where they were stopped, and the condi-
tion of the cars could be observed. However, I could not say
just where I was when I first saw the other car or just
where it was, or how fast it was going. Within half an
hour after the accident, and with my trained experience of
knowing the important factors, I wrote what was probably
the most unsatisfactory report my insurer had received for
a long time."7
In how many other legal situations would lawyers be so helpless
to recall and analyze pertinent factors for the purpose of estab-
lishing legal responsibility? Because of this inability of people
really to remember what happened in traffic accidents, many
lawyers will agree that traffic accident cases are unique in the
extent to which parties and witnesses, as well as lawyers in
conferring with them, are subject to inducements to exaggerate,
to resort to half-truth, and to flirt with the boundaries of out-
right perjury.
The difficulty in auto cases of applying the "fault" criterion
is compounded by other difficulties. For example,, the delay of
years between accident and trial means that those witnesses
who are still available cannot possibly remember accurately the
minutiae of the speed and placement of cars in complex incidents
that occurred in a few split seconds years ago-even if you
assume they could do so right after the accident. Added to this
almost necessarily inaccurate testimony is the bias of any party
toward his own cause, which is aggravated in automobile cases
by the inordinate pride that almost every motorist takes in his
own driving and his concomitant inability to concede his own
driving error-especially when an accident has followed. The
result of all this is that automobile litigation is more fraught
with both innocent misrepresentation and outright perjury than
any other area of contested litigation.
Assume, however, that a traffic victim is fortuitously able
to negotiate all the shoals of a negligence suit and succeeds in
establishing the defendant's liability. Other difficulties still
remain.
The measurement of damages in these personal injury cases
is often wildly intuitive.
7. Letter from Laurence H. Eldredge, Esq., Feb. 26, 1964.
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At a recent legal medical seminar, a prominent personal
injury lawyer spoke unabashedly of his craft to his peers:
"I put in my book, at least, the appearance of the plaintiff
as number one in attempting to evaluate [personal injury]
law suit because I think that a good healthy-appearing type,
one who would be likeable and one that the jury is going to
want to do something for, can make your case worth double
at least what it would be otherwise, and a bad-appearing
plaintiff could make the case worth perhaps less than half
of what it might be otherwise." 8
How is it that the system allows compensation for injury to turn
on such relatively frivolous factors? Of course, it is true that
toting up a victim's out-of-pocket losses-medical expenses, lost
wages, damage to his motor vehicle, etc,-is rather automatic.
But projecting losses into the future-predicting potential med-
ical expenses and reduction in earning power and calculating
their present worth-is much trickier. It is true that relatively
simple actuarial techniques can be used, and this can be a fairly
rational process. The fact remains, however, that the estimate
for the future is almost certain to be wrong one way or the
other, for at best it is an educated guess. And the degree of
uncertainty is multiplied manifold by still other problems in
establishing personal injury damages. How is one to measure,
for example, the value of the loss of a leg-especially the pain
and suffering, both past and future-in dollars and cents? The
answer, of course, as many courts have had to admit, is that
one cannot. And yet, this measuring the unmeasurable is pre-
cisely what the jury is asked to do. The result is that the matter
of damages is turned over to the jury's discretion with only the
most permissive limits on its exercise. The result, in turn, is
license to squander or stint through whim or bias. The result,
too, is added delay while the parties argue over the unanswerable.
Even for the occasional person who strikes it rich, however,
the woe is not ended. Not only will he be left with the injuries
and suffering that compensation is designed to rectify, but also
the process of gaining the compensation will often aggravate
his condition. Because any victim will, rightly, fear getting less
if he appears before a jury fully healed or rehabilitated (with,
for instance, an artificial leg that he can expertly use), very
8. IOWA ACADEMY OF TRIAL LAWYERS, LEGAL-IEDICAL SEMINAR 119-21
(State University of Iowa College of Law, 1963).
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often he will forego treatment or rehabilitation during the long
delay between accident and trial in order to appear before a sym-
pathetic jury as pathetically handicapped as possible. If the
gamble pays off and a large award results, it may still be too
small for the more expensive care required by a late start at
rehabilitation. And, of course, there is no guarantee, and indeed
probably little chance, that the award will be spent on rehabilita-
tion anyway. Several studies have shown that most automobile
accident victims are unaccustomed to the management of a rela-
tively large sum of money and will allow their awards to be
dissipated. 9
Another barrier to full recompense is the high cost of legal
representation for claimaints-a corollary of the uncertainty
and delay under the present system. Lawyers who try negligence
cases come from a very specialized and accomplished group, and
their unique capacity to wring large verdicts from juries will
often cost the victim a third or more of the resulting verdict. A
recent study of traffic injuries in Michigan, for example, found
that 68 per cent of those who recovered from the other party
incurred "collection expenses" ranging up to 60 per cent of their
settlement, with a mean of 32 per cent in all cases in which ex-
penses were incurred. 10 Most of this expense is paid to lawyers
in the form of a "contingent fee," i.e. the lawyer agrees to take
a percentage of whatever payment is made (usually around 33%
but often higher) but to receive nothing if the case is lost and
therefore nothing is paid. Regardless of the merits of contingent
fees for personal injury lawyers-and they are the subject of
intense controversy-it is significant for our purposes that, ac-
cording to one commonly held theory, contingent fees survive in
the United States as a corrective of the "risk involved in the
gamble of a negligence suit."" A lawyer won't collect from some
of his clients so he must charge higher for those he does collect
from. Also the claimant is so unsure of whether or how much
he will recover that he can't afford to agree to pay a set sub-
stantial fee regardless of the outcome.
All this is not to condemn the lawyer and his contingent fee.
On the contrary, given the unreasonable complexity of the pres-
9. CONARD 81, 84.
10. Id. at 190-91.
11. EHRENZWEIG, "FULL AID" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM-A
VOLUNTARY COMPENSATION PLAN 6 (1954) : For a slightly revised version of the
book, see Ebrenzweig, "Full Aid" Insurance for the Traffic Victim-A Voluntary
Compensation Plan, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 10 (1955).
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ent system, the lawyer often more than earns his fee in guiding
his client up the tortuous path to payment. Rather the quarrel
is with the overly complex system that requires such expensive
services in almost all cases-large and small.
Obviously, then, the present system of compensating traffic
victims, based on legal liability for negligence, is hugely ex-
pensive and inefficient-paying even more for the overhead of
insurance companies, lawyers, and courts than for the compensa-
tion of victims, and inequitably distributing the compensation it
does pay. In sum it provides too little, too late, and does it
unfairly, wastefully and corruptingly.
What, then, is the answer?
Perhaps it could be the Basic Protection Plan which Profes-
sor Robert E. Keeton, of the Harvard Law School, and I drafted
after a three-year study conducted at the Harvard Law School
and which we think would solve the most pressing problems
posed by the present automobile claims system. 12
The Basic Protection proposal entails two principal features.
The first is a new form of compulsory automobile insurance 13
(called Basic Protection coverage), which compensates all per-
sons injured in traffic accidents without regard to anyone's
fault or lack of it. 14 Basic Protection insurance pays for losses
up to limits of $10,000 per victim for every victim's out-of-
pocket losses-which consists principally of medical expenses
and wage losses. 15 No payment is made under Basic Protection
for pain and suffering. 6 Whenever a motorist carrying Basic
Protection insurance is in an accident and he, or a guest, or a
pedestrian, is injured, the motorist's own Basic Protection in-
surance company compensates him or his guest or the pedes-
trian. 17
The second feature of the Basic Protection proposal sharply
reduces negligence litigation by a statutory exemption. All
those persons who are insured (which will mean virtually all
motorists since Basic Protection insurance will be compulsory)
are exempt from legal liability for negligent driving if damages
for pain and suffering (as now measured in negligence cases)
12. See note 4 8upra.
13. BASIC PROTECTION 286-288.
14. Id. at 276-77.
15. Id. at 280, 283.
16. Id. at 285-86.
17. Id. at 274.
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are not greater than $5,000 and other damages (such as for
medical expense and wage loss) are not greater than $10,000.18
In all other cases, the effect of the exemption is to reduce the
liability for negligence by these same amounts. In other words,
if a victim injured by a person carrying Basic Protection in-
surance suffers, say, $500 of medical expenses and $1,000 of
wage loss, he is not able to recover anything in a negligence suit
for his out-of-pocket loss and very likely nothing for pain and
suffering since it is so unlikely that, in such a case, the finding
for pain and suffering would exceed $5,000. Rather, he is
reimbursed for his medical and wage loss by Basic Protection
insurance. But, if the victim suffers, say, $6,000 of medical ex-
penses and $12,000 of wage loss, he recovers $8,000 in a negli-
gence suit, for his out-of-pocket loss is paid to him under Basic
Protection insurance. For his pain and suffering, he recovers
in a negligence suit whatever the jury awards him in that cat-
egory, minus $5,000.
Note, then, that this exemption from legal liability for negli-
gence performs two crucial functions.
(1) It eliminates suits over negligence in a great mass of
cases of less severe injury, in which damages under claims for
negligence could not exceed $5,000 for pain and suffering or
$10,000 for other damages. These are precisely the cases in
which the amount spent in trying to determine "who must pay
what" tends to be disproportionate to the amount ever actually
paid. Thus, the exemption drastically reduces the number of
cases in which the expense of litigation and preparation for the
prospect of litigation will be incurred, since the percentage of
injuries so severe as to escape applicability of the exemption is
small. The effect on both court congestion and the adminis-
trative overhead of the automobile claims system will be distinct-
ly beneficial. (2) In both types of cases-both large and small-
the exemption serves to avoid duplication or overlapping be-
tween basic protection payments and amounts received from
negligence claims. In other words, when out-of-pocket loss is
under $10,000, it will be paid for only under basic protection
insurance; losses in excess of that amount will be paid for
through automobile negligence insurance.
Although this new coverage is like workmen's compensation
in calling for payments on a basis of liability without fault and
18. Id. at 274-76.
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for periodic payments as losses occur, it is nonetheless very dif-
ferent in other important respects. Unlike workmen's compensa-
tion laws generally, the proposed Basic Protection law preserves
negligence actions for cases of severe injury-cases in which
negligence damages exceed the exemption. Also, the Basic Pro-
tection plan does not require a separate marketing system or a
separate system of administrative machinery like a workmen's
compensation board. Rather, we propose that the new coverage
be marketed through existing channels of private enterprise now
used for automobile liability insurance and that claims be pro-
cessed through present institutions and procedures-including
jury trial of not only the negligence suits that are preserved but
also the more substantial Basic Protection claims (involving at
least $5,000 of out-of-pocket loss) .9 Further, the proposed act
does not provide a schedule of fixed benefits for each specific
type of injury, as does workmen's compensation. Rather, re-
imbursement is based only on actual losses as they accrue.20
Thus, Basic Protection insurance bears more similarity to cur-
rent tort insurance than to workmen's compensation insurance.
The closest analogy in present insurance covering legal liability
for negligence, however, is medical payment coverage-the very
common supplementary coverage under present auto policies
under which a motorist's own insurance company agrees to pay
him or occupants of his car for medical expenses incurred in
treatment of a traffic injury, regardless of anyone's fault.
A few additional points will help to explain the practical
operation of the new plan.
Basic Protection benefits will not duplicate benefits from
other sources such as sick leave, Blue Cross, or accident and
health insurance policies. 21 Thus, to the extent that loss is
covered by other benefits, Basic Protection benefits will not be
paid. To put it another way, Basic Protection benefits are
designed to reimburse net loss only.
Basic Protection benefits are payable month-by-month as
losses accrue, and not in a lump sum as are damages from a
negligence suit. (Basic Protection benefits may be paid by lump
sum payments in special circumstances-for example, when the
amounts are too small to justify the expense of periodic pay-
ment) .22
19. Id. at 293-94, 295.
20. Id. at 280.
21. Id. at 278-79.
22. Id. at 277-78.
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Damage to property, including motor vehicles, is not covered
by Basic Protection; property damage claims will continue to be
handled under present law and insurance coverage. 23 Damage
to vehicles is already covered in most cases by insurance payable
without reference to fault, since most cars in use today are
covered by so-called "collision" insurance under which a motor-
ist's own insurance company pays him for damage to his car,
regardless of fault. Consequently, it seems wise to limit reform
to the major social problem now produced by automobile ac-
cidents-compensating victims of personal injury.
Although Basic Protection coverage is limited to out-of-pocket
loss and does not reimburse for pain and suffering, a policy-
holder may, if he wishes, purchase optional "added protection"
coverage to reimburse him for his pain and inconvenience arising
out of an automobile accident. Similarly, although Basic Pro-
tection coverage is limited to a total of only $10,000 of loss, a
policyholder, may, if he wishes, purchase optional added protec-
tion called "catastrophe protection," providing benefits up to
$100,000 in addition to basic protection benefits.24
A Basic Protection insurance policy-like the present auto-
mobile insurance policy-will be issued to the owner to cover a
vehicle described in the policy. The new coverage will be mar-
keted in the same way and through the same sources as present
automobile insurance. 2
At least two other elements of the Basic Protection deserve
discussion. First, since, as many studies show, it is the catas-
trophically injured victim who suffers most, why do we con-
centrate on the other end of the spectrum by providing com-
pulsory coverage under Basic Protection for the first $10,000 in
loss? Second, since, according to our own arguments, the negli-
gence criterion is so difficult to apply in traffic cases, why do
we preserve it for the larger ones?
As to the catastrophically injured, it is important to note that
the Basic Protection system is of great help. (1) It pays him
his first $10,000 of loss and does so promptly, which will ob-
viously be a great aid to him. (2) It will clear the court dockets
so that his tort claim for more compensation can be promptly
heard. (3) It makes available to him on a voluntary basis
added protection to cover catastrophic losses.
23. Id. at 280-281.
24. Id. at 284-85.
25. Id. at 295.
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As to why we have not made catastrophe protection com-
pulsory-instead of or in addition to Basic Protection-the
catastrophically injured traffic victim does not present a unique
social problem different from that of the catastrophically af-
flicted in general-whether afflicted from a fall or cancer. But
the relatively minor traffic injury does pose a unique problem-
a problem which is soluble separately. The relatively minor traf-
fic injury-with its extant and separate insurance coverage, with
its wasteful system of compensation, and its devastating effect
on our court system-does indeed present a problem that can
rationally be carved out and dealt with separately.
As to why we preserve negligence litigation in the larger
traffic cases, no system of insurance payable without reference
to fault-such as basic protection-ever seems to supply full
compensation to the catastrophically injured. In the words of
one eminent authority, Professor Alfred Conard of the Univer-
sity of Michigan, making up the huge losses of the catastrophical-
ly injured above a basic level remains all over the world "the
virtual monopoly" of negligence claims. 26 Thus, according to
the same authority, the ideal claim system would keep "alive the
plurality of existing programs-from social security to damages
[for negligence] ",.27
Secondly, proposals to eliminate completely the common law
action for negligence arising out of automobile accidents are per-
haps doomed to founder as unable to muster the necessary wide-
spread political support. The concept of liability based on fault
is deeply rooted in our society and will not be lightly cast aside.
Moreover, apart from pragmatic considerations and purely on
grounds of principle, to make a case for basic protection for the
traffic victim regardless of fault is not to make a case for the to-
tal irrelevance of fault. Especially in the egregious case in which
injuries and damages reach catastrophic proportions and fault is
clear, there is much to be said for visiting all that negligence
damages entail on the person at fault, and thereby including in
the award compensation for the pain and suffering accompanying
a prolonged and bitter convalescence or permanent disability.
Let me return to the question of court congestion since that
is a question of such central concern. In their book, Public Lcw
26. COiARD et al. 86.
27. Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63 MICH. L. REV.
279, 326 (1964).
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Perspectives on a Private Law Problem,2 Professors Walter
Blum and Harry Kalven of the University of Chicago Law School
admit that traffic cases play a key role in causing court conges-
tion in many parts of the United States.29 They insist, however,
that court congestion and resulting delay constitute a separate
problem that should be dealt with separately, apart from any
plan for liability without fault in traffic cases. 30 One may
doubt that the two problems can be separated. If simplification
of the standard of liability would remove the principal cause for
the large number of traffic cases that cannot be settled because
fault is so difficult to resolve, is it not rather arbitrary to insist
that the congestion-and-delay problem be regarded as an in-
dependent question? As previously pointed out, separate solu-
tions for court congestion may be self-defeating in that the more
the backlog of traffic cases is reduced, the more additional cases
will be entered for trial, thus wiping out any saving achieved.
It may not be valid, then, to say, as Blum and Kalven do, that
a fault system inevitably involves delay while fault is investiga-
ted and that traffic accidents should not be treated differently
from any other group of cases.3 1 Perhaps a special situation cal-
ling for special solution is presented when we are faced with a
huge class of cases intractable to the fault criterion. Indeed,
even if we should concede that the fault issue is a manageable
one in traffic cases viewed one by one, their inordinate number
(which will continue to mushroom, just given the variables of
more cars, more young people, and less space) 3 2 might justify
simplifying the issues for traffic cases alone in order to relieve
the log jam. There comes a point at which we simply cannot
afford the luxury of dissecting each traffic accident to see who
is at fault for the purpose of deciding what compensation shall
be paid. We end up spending more on the process than we do
on compensation, and as Professor Conard and his colleagues in
their Michigan study have shown-far from satisfying people's
sense of justice-end up outraging them by the delay and anxiety
involved in the process.33  (Perhaps the analogy to our federal
tax laws is instructive. There the law says that for incomes
under $10,000, we need not bother to dissect each return to see
28. BLUM & KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROB-
LEm-AUTO COMPENSATION PLANS (1965), published earlier as an article, 31 U.
CHI. L. REV. 641 (1964).
29. Id. at 75, 31 U. CIII. L. REV. at 713.
30. Id. at 76, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. at 714.
31. Id. at 71, 31 U. C.Hi. L. REV. at 709.
32. See BASIC PROTECTION 11-12.
33. CONARD et al. 8-9, 280-81.
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what deductions should be made but rather use a standard de-
ductible.)
Of course I am aware, as I suggested earlier, that other solu-
tions to the court delays caused by auto accident cases have long
been advanced. In addition to appointing more judges and
abolishing jury trials in such cases, we hear, for example, of (1)
the split trial procedure, (2) the pre-trial conference, (3) com-
pulsory arbitration of small claims, and (4) hearings before
auditors, all advanced as panaceas. 34 But in a scholarly and ex-
pert review of all these devices, Professor Maurice Rosenberg,
formerly Director of the Project for Effective Justice at the
Columbia Law School, rejects each of them as a promising solu-
tion to court congestion. Says Rosenberg, "Today it can be
fairly said that there is no acceptable evidence that any remedy
so far devised has been efficacious to any substantial extent.' 35
He does admit, however, to one exception: "It is clear that if the
intake of [personal injury cases] . . . were shut off, the work
load of many jammed courts would shrivel to insignificance.
With sharply cut loads, the courts presumably would soon get
and remain current in dispatching their dockets. ' '36
The basic protection plan, then, by eliminating the great
mass of smaller auto accident cases would clearly, under Rosen-
berg's analysis, go a long way toward solving the problem of
court congestion.
This is not to say that the primary aim of the basic protec-
tion plan is to eliminate court congestion. Even if court dockets
were uncrowded, other features of the present automobile claims
system cry out for reform by the basic protection plan. As
already suggested, the present system not only clogs our courts
but is highly wasteful and expensive. Studies show that $2.20
must be paid in for each dollar that is paid out to an injured
accident victim.3 The present system, in addition, leaves many
victims either totally uncompensated or with only a fraction of
their loss paid-especially among the seriously injured .3  On
the other hand, the present system provides generous and even
profligate compensation to others-especially among the trivially
34. ROSENBERG, COURT CONGESTION: STATUS, CAUSES, AND THE PROPOSED
REMEDIES, IN THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAw EXPLOSION 29, 46 (Jones
ed., 1065).
35. Id. at 55.
36. Id. at 38.
37. CONARD et al. 59.
38. BASIC PROTECTION 35-37.
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injured. The present system is also marred by the temptations
to dishonesty, mentioned earlier, that trap a stunning percent-
age of drivers and victims by requiring that each person "re-
member" the details of what happened in the agony of a split-
second of collision months or even years before and further
requires him-if he wants to be paid-to "remember" that he
was careful and the other fellow careless.
All this would require reform even if there were no court
congestion. But the bitter delays of years' time added to court
calendars by auto accident cases unquestionably lend powerful
support to an already overwhelming need for reform.
At the outset I mentioned the comparison between basic pro-
tection insurance and fire insurance. Basic protection insur-
ance-like fire insurance-would be payable by your own in-
surance company for your out-of-pocket loss without regard to
anyone's fault.
Suppose, however, that instead of proposing to apply a sys-
tem like fire insurance to automobile insurance, I were to sug-
gest the opposite-namely applying the auto insurance system
to fire insurance. Suppose I suggested that after a fire, a vic-
tim could be paid for his loss:
(1) Only if he could prove that someone else was at fault
or that he was free from fault (e.g., if he had failed to reshingle
his roof with fire resistant materials, he couldn't recover, with
all the attendant problems of proof).
(2) Only after he had hired a lawyer to press a claim against
someone else's insurance company which felt no loyalty or good-
will toward him.
(3) Only after months or-more likely-years of delay.
(4) Only after squabbling over a totally indeterminate
amount (for example, assume after a fire a homeowner would
be entitled to claim not only for his out-of-pocket loss, such as
the market value of his burned couch, but also for his pain
and suffering arising from the fact that his beloved Aunt Minnie
gave him the couch, with all the attendant problems of proof
here, too).
Suppose I made that suggestion. No one would ever agree
to trade the present fire insurance system for the jungle I have
just outlined. And yet, in essence, is not that just what those
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who propose to retain the present system are suggesting for
auto insurance?
It's true that traffic accidents in some respects are different
from fires. Serious traffic injuries are probably more likely
to be caused by provable and genuinely blameworthy conduct-
witness, for example, the high percentage of fatal traffic ac-
cidents attributable to alcohol.39 So it makes sense to undergo
the costs of determining fault in traffic cases of quite severe
injury. But as to the great bulk of traffic accident claims, isn't
it time we paid the traffic accident victim like the victim of a
fire-promptly, graciously and fairly, and without chewing up
most of the available money through the expenses of lawyers,
insurance companies, and the courts, all of whose talents are ,3o
wasted in battling over unrealistically complicated criteria for
payment?
And on this question of wasting legal-as well as other-
talent, we reach an issue of real bite. Not long ago, there was
released a film produced by the American Trial Lawyers (ATL),
the organization of plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers, in co-
operation with the University of Michigan Law School, showing
a trial of a typical law suit. The purpose of the film, according
to the publication "Trial," the magazine of ATL, is to help
"revive the 'vanishing breed' of the trial lawyer." Says "Trial":
"The American Trial Lawyers Association has learned
from its many successful continuing legal education sem-
inars . . . that there is an 'underlying respect and admira-
tion among law school students for the field of advocacy and
the courtroom expertise of the top trial expert.'...
"With this psychological base of admiration and 'respect,'
combined with the acknowledged increased remuneration now
available in trial practice, the ATL Board of Governors voted
funds for special law school [projects] ... distinct from the
regularly scheduled lawyer seminars ....
"The result: [ATL] ... chose as an effective teaching aid
and as an inspiring media [sic], the most obvious, but not
expensive, of the audio-visual aids-the universal motion
picture medium....
39. E. G. NORMAN, ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS-EPIDEMIOLOGY, CONTROL, AND
PREVENTION 61-67 (World Health Organization Public Health Papers No. 12,
1962).
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"The series develops around a hypothetical representa-
tive civil case, William v. Andrews. It is based on an actual
trial....
"The films are legally accurate and in excellent taste, while
retaining interest and action to give the feeling and expertise
of an actual trial.
40
Among the lawyers participating in the film are such eminent
trial lawyers as James Dempsy, While Plains, New York, former
president of the International Academy of Trial Lawyers; Craig
Spangenberg, Cleveland, Ohio, a past national ATL vice-pres-
ident; and Jacob D. Fuchsberg, New York, New York, a past
national ATL president.
Not surprisingly, the "representative civil case" selected by
ATL and the University of Michigan was an intersectional col-
lision between two automobiles.
But the result for anyone looking at the films objectively is
not to illustrate the glories of trials and trial work, but un-
wittingly to confirm what has already been said about the almost
incredible waste of talent and money and time and energy of
countless experts and ordinary citizens in arguing about matters
unworthy of a small fraction of the resources expended.
In her first interview at her lawyer's office, the plaintiff in
the film says, in describing the accident, "Since I was going to
turn left I had my signal on. Out of the corner of my eye, I sud-
denly saw the other car. Then there was a terrible shock. I
just can't explain it. It was an awful feeling."'4 1 Later in taking
the plaintiff to the scene of the accident to reconstruct it, her
lawyer says to her, "Like every accident, it probably happened
pretty fast. I know your recollection is pretty confused. And
that is only natural. It probably happened with startling sud-
denness and in addition, a great deal of time has elapsed since
it happened." To each of these statements the client readily
agrees.
At the scene of the accident, the following exchange takes
place.
Says the woman, "I came to a full stop. I remember there
40. A $100,000 Teaching Experimental, TRIAL, August/September, 1966, pp.
20-21.
41. This and other quotes from the film are not precisely verbatim from the
sound track but a close approximation based on careful notes made during multiple
runs of the film.
662 [Vol. XXVII
BASIC PROTECTION
were two-no-three cars to my left and I waited for each
of them to clear the intersection and then I pulled out slowly.
Then this other car plowed right through the stop sign and
hit me."
"You didn't see the truck go through the stop sign, did
you ?"
"No, but it must have been the way it hit me."
"Did you see the truck when it hit you?"
"No, not exactly. I sort of saw it out of the corner of my
eye, the way you see things that way."
"How far away was the truck when you first saw it?"
"Well, how can I tell, I can't say."
"How fast was it going?"
"Well, it was traveling fast, I'll tell you that. It's been
such a long time. I wasn't paying that much attention. In
addition, I'm just no good at gauging distances and speed."
At that point, plaintiff's lawyer tells her that she will have
to remember as best she could. Then as the scene fades out,
the narrator comments that the lawyer explains the rules of
negligence and contributory negligence to his client making clear
that if she is to be paid, she must establish negligence on the
part of the other driver and no contributory negligence on her
part. The lawyer is then shown saying to the client, "You are
going to have to try to remember. Whether you like it or not,
you are going to have to recall distances and speed."
Of course this exchange is not surprising to anyone who has
ever tried an automobile accident case. This prodding of wit-
nesses and clients to remember the unrememberable-and mak-
ing very clear the unfortunate consequences to a client of not
remembering-is standard procedure in almost every automobile
accident case. What emerges, of course, is not likely to be real
memory but a mixture heavily larded with wishful thinking.
Thereafter, throughout the preparation during the trial it is
made abundantly clear that no one remembers very precisely
what happened. Certainly the defendant's memory is diametri-
cally opposed to the plaintiff's. According to him, he stopped
but she turned suddenly without using her turn signal. In ad-
dition, wholly differing views on whether the defendant or plain-
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tiff drove properly are advanced from varying witnesses. (One
witness who purports to be positive on this point is proven to
have been situated where he couldn't see what he was purporting
to remember.) Indeed after all the prodding of plaintiff by one
of her counsel, another of plaintiff's lawyers, in speaking. of her
recollection to a third person, says, "Keep in mind that my client
may be mistaken. She has told us certain things which I am
sure she means in good faith, but she may be telling us things
she really doesn't know or that are wrong. Everyone at an ac-
cident sees things differently and remembers things differently."
Of course this kind of total confusion can be true for other
litigated matters as well, but no one really doubts that the in-
ability of counsel, clients, witnesses, and even courts to recon-
struct accurately the split-second occurrences in traffic accidents
is far more prevalent than in other types of litigation and this
film makes that abundantly clear as just the few quoted ex-
amples illustrate.
In the course of the film, we learn at the pretrial conference
that the plaintiff's damages from the accident were approx-
imately as follows:
Doctor's bills $135
Brace $ 25
X-Ray $ 10
Emergency room $ 5
Property damage to vehicle $365
The property damage was probably covered by collision insur-
ance and much of the rest by either medical payments coverage
or health and accident insurance. (This is confirmed by the
vigorous attempt by the defendant to introduce evidence of pay-
ment of the plaintiff's losses by other sources-even to the point
of appealing the trial judge's ruling excluding such evidence in
an attempt to try to persuade the Supreme Court of the State
to change the collateral source rules which excludes consideration
of other payments.) The defendant's loss was limited to $15
to $20 worth of damage to his car which he hadn't bothered to
have repaired.
On the basis, then, of a case with this kind of out-of-pocket
expenditure, the following outpouring of effort and expense
occurs:
Many conferences between lawyers and client on both sides.
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Many conferences between lawyers and witnesses, often
with a tape recorder-conferences with all kinds of witnesses
"reluctant, dogmatic and hostile." Many of these interviews are
shown as lasting almost an hour or longer. All result in ex-
tensive signed written statements.
Canvassing of neighborhoods to uncover new witnesses by
both sides.
Extended conferences among lawyers for both sides prepar-
ing elaborate trial briefs.
Extended conferences among lawyers for both sides over
trial tactics.
Extended legal research on both sides on the law governing
right of way, dominant vs. serviant highways, stop signs, reason-
able expectation of unforeseen conduct by other drivers, etc.
Extended visits to the scene by clients and witnesses with,
in one instance, police holding up traffic and cars placed in posi-
tions to simulate the position of the accident cars before, dur-
ing, and after the accident with accompanying careful measure-
ments of distances by lawyers and investigators.
IDepositions of parties and witnesses lasting more than an
hour with a court reporter transcribing each word and supplying
multiple copies.
Maps, photographs, surveys, and plats of the scene prepared
by professionals with scientific precision to reproduce exactly
eye level views, distances, proper scale, etc.
Pretrial motions in court.
Pretial conferences between counsel and the judge.
A trial of several days length before a judge and jury. (At
a pretrial conference the plaintiff indicates that his case will
take two days, the defendant, about a day and one half. The
judge indicates firmly that two days should be enough. We are
not told how long the trial actually takes.)
Post-trial motions in court, with briefs presented on both
sides.
JA probable appeal.
IThe whole process permeated with impatience, distrust,
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animosity, anxiety, and anguish among parties, witnesses, and
even counsel.
The plaintiff wins (as one might expect from the film
produced by the organization of plaintiffs' lawyers). We are
not told how much the verdict is. But we do know that the
defendant moves to have the verdict set aside as excessive, with
the observation that a verdict of about $3,000 would have been
proper. We also learn through the pre-trial negotiation that
plaintiff's lawyer thinks she might get as high as $10,000, that
he "expects" $6,500, but he might accept $3,500 in settlement,
and turns down $2,500.
In terms of her damages, it is true that in addition to her
medical bills, etc., the plaintiff claims a painful and possibly per-
manent neck injury from the accident, aggravating a previous
condition. But watching all the expensive preparation of the
case, one wonders how much is left of any judgment to com-
pensate her for her discomfiture. (Note that under Basic Pro-
tection insurance if she desires compensation for her pain and
inconvenience she could purchase optional coverage providing
such payment. Thus Basic Protection does not do away with
such coverage: It makes it available to those willing to pay for
it.) 42
It is true that because of the allegedly permanent nature of
the plaintiff's neck injury, hers is a case where a negligence ac-
tion might still be allowed under the Basic Protection system.4 3
But this is a marginal case and thus all cases less than this in
magnitude would be handled exclusively under Basic Protection.
So even if you assume this case could result in a negligence
suit under basic protection, the type of waste attendant on would
still be eliminated in the myriad cases of less severe injury. The
tragedy today is that the type of effort and resources illustrated
in the ATL film are expended in varying degrees in almost every
one of the countless traffic accidents resulting in personal injury
occurring every day in every jurisdiction.
As a result, there probably could be no better advertisement
for Basic Protection reform than the showing of this ATL film
throughout the country. The waste of commensurate time and
money in deciding in so many cases whether millions of traffic
victims are to be paid from applicable insurance after traffic
42. BASIC PROTECTION 284-85.
43. Id. at 274-76, 447-48.
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accidents is so patent that the film ends up as a most eloquent
advocate for changing the present system. Once again, one can
only ask what would be the reaction if we had to go through all
this or at least had to prepare to go through all this concerning
the availability of insurance after every fire?
The irony is that all this waste and unnecessary uncertainty
will be apparent to all but those few who may be blinded by
their participation in this profligate process: Preoccupation with
the mechanics of the process apparently caused the ATL to select
this type of case for this film, supposedly to put its best foot
forward-to "inspire" the young to develop and devote their
talents in such affairs! (Of course in a way ATL is trapped. If
one is going to talk about a "representative civil case" today, he
almost has to talk about an automobile accident case-there are
so many more of them than any other kind!)
The glories of the trial bar can be revived but they are
demeaned when they are endlessly devoted to endlessly picking
away at who went through stop signs months or even years
before.
The time has come, as ATL suggests, to revive the glories of
the trial bar-but this can only be done by a system which uses
their talents in cases worthy of them. This should become more
and more apparent to everyone.
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